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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 05-2062
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.

BILL MURRAY,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Judge: Honorable Bruce W. Kauffman
District Court No.: 02-cr-300-02

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 10, 2006
Before: SMITH, ALDISERT, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 16, 2006 )

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Bill Murray was charged with and convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine base
with the intent to distribute it in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and maintaining a location
for the storage and distribution of a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

856(a)(2).1 The District Court sentenced Murray to two 84-month terms of imprisonment
to be served concurrently, ordered six years of supervised release, and imposed a $200
special assessment. Following the trial, Murray moved for a judgment of acquittal under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c), claiming that the evidence against him was
insufficient to sustain the conviction on either count. The District Court denied the
motion. Murray filed this timely appeal, challenging the judgment of conviction as to the
conspiracy.2 For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.
I.
On October 18, 2001, during a narcotics investigation, several Allentown police
officers knocked on the door of an apartment at 941 Hamilton Street in Allentown.
Murray’s co-defendant, Franklin Butler, opened the door with a gun in his hand. Upon
seeing the police, Butler attempted to close the door, but police forced it open and entered
the apartment. They pursued Butler into a small bedroom where they discovered Murray
sitting at a small table, cutting a white rock substance, which appeared to be crack
cocaine, with a razor. There were approximately five crack pipes on the table.
The officers secured both Butler and Murray. In conducting a search of Butler’s
person, they discovered thirty-seven small Ziploc bags containing crack cocaine and $947
1

Murray was acquitted on a third count, namely, possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base, and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C).
2

Murray does not appeal the District Court’s ruling with respect to the conviction
under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2).
2

in cash. After receiving a Miranda warning, Butler admitted that the gun–which was
found under a blanket nearby–belonged to him and that he used it to protect his drugs. He
also admitted that he earned approximately $5000 on drug sales during a “good week” at
the apartment. App. at 67.
An officer also advised Murray of his Miranda rights. Waiving his right to remain
silent, Murray explained that he rented the apartment and that he was about to “do a line
of coke” before the police entered the room. App. at 68. He consented to a search of the
premises. During the search, the police discovered a 16-ounce bottle of Inositol, an agent
used to cut cocaine, unused glassine baggies in the closet, two cellular phones, and an
identification card belonging to Murray. The police did not find any drugs on Murray’s
person; he was carrying only $18.39. During a subsequent interview, Murray listed the
apartment at 941 Hamilton as his address.
II.
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When considering the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting a conviction, we determine if the evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to find that the
government had proved all the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See
United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted).
III.
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In order to establish a conspiracy, the Government must prove, among other
things, that “the alleged conspirators shared a ‘unity of purpose,’ the intent to achieve a
common goal, and an agreement to work together toward the goal.” United States v.
Wexler, 838 F.2d 88, 90-91(3d Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Kates, 508 F.2d 308,
310-11 (3d Cir. 1975)). All of the elements of a conspiracy, including the element of
intent, may be proven by circumstantial evidence. See id. (citations omitted). Murray
appeals his conviction, claiming that, although he may have been using drugs, there is
insufficient evidence to establish that he and Butler shared a “unity of purpose” to
distribute the drugs. We disagree and, accordingly, will affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
In support of his argument, Murray relies on our decisions in Wexler, 838 F.2d 88,
United States v. Cartwright, 359 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2004), United States v. Thomas, 114
F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1997), and United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1991). In
each of these cases, we reversed a conspiracy conviction where there was no evidence
that the defendant had any contact with the drugs, concluding that the Government had
failed to prove that the defendant was aware that a controlled substance–as opposed to
some other contraband–was the object of the conspiracy.3 Unlike the defendants in

3

In Cartwright, the defendant acted as an armed lookout for a supplier carrying
cocaine in a shopping bag, but we held that the evidence did not show that the defendant
had ever been in possession of the cocaine or otherwise knew that cocaine was being
exchanged. 359 F.3d at 288-91. In Thomas, customs officials seized drugs from a
suitcase and then left it in a hotel room, and the defendant unlocked, entered, and then
4

Wexler, Cartwright, Thomas, and Salmon, however, Murray cannot contend that he was
unaware of the object of the conspiracy: he was caught red-handed (or perhaps more
accurately, white-handed), physically touching the substance, which he acknowledged
was cocaine.
In a second line of cases, we have overturned a defendant’s conviction for
possession or conspiracy to possess drugs where there was no evidence that the defendant
exercised dominion or control over the drugs. See United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673 (3d
Cir. 1993) (reversing conviction of Brown’s alleged co-conspirator, Ana Baltimore, based
our conclusion that “while the evidence may be sufficient to show that Baltimore was
residing at the Brown home and that she knew that drugs were in the house, the evidence
is not sufficient to support a finding that she exercised dominion and control over the
drugs”); United States v. Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814 (3d Cir. 1996) (overturning conviction on
sufficiency grounds where the defendant was sitting in his underwear in close proximity
to drugs and distribution materials, but where there was no evidence that he had

exited the hotel room without the suitcase, but the defendant testified that he had merely
been offered $500 to check on the suitcase, and we held that the evidence did not
controvert his story or show that he knew drugs were involved. 114 F.3d at 404-06. In
Salmon, the defendant rode in a car with the seller to a parking lot, opened the trunk of
the car, stood nearby while the seller interacted with the buyer, and then drove the car
away from the parking lot. A bag containing drugs was subsequently found on the buyer,
but we held that the evidence did not show that the bag came from the car, nor did it show
that the defendant would have known that the bag contained drugs even if it did come
from the car. 944 F.2d at 1112-15. In Wexler, the defendant acted as a lookout during the
movement of a truck hauling drugs, but we held that the evidence did not show that the
defendant knew that the truck contained drugs. 838 F.2d at 91-92.
5

physically handled the contraband). These cases are also inapposite. In Brown and
Jenkins, there was no evidence that the defendants had physically touched the drugs or
that they owned or controlled the properties in which they were housed. Cf. Jackson v.
Bird, 105 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming denial of state habeas petition where drugs
were discovered in room of another resident, but defendant was lessee of the apartment).
In this case, the Government presented evidence that Murray was not only actively
engaged in cutting the crack cocaine, but that he was the lessee of the apartment where
Butler distributed drugs. His actual physical possession of the drugs and, as lessee of the
apartment, his control over the premises are relevant facts from which the jury could have
inferred that Murray shared Butler’s goal of distributing drugs. This evidence,
circumstantial though it may be, is sufficient, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the government, to allow a rational trier of fact to find that Murray was engaged in a
conspiracy in violation 21 U.S.C. § 846. Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
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